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DO WE REALLY WANT STUDENTS TO LEARN.

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OUR EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM ENCOURAGES STUDENTS TO PERFORM IN ORDER TO MEASURE UP TO STANDARDS SET BY OTHERS RATHER THAN TO LEARN PERSONALLY, TO CHANGE THEMSELVES AND THEIR BEHAVIOR AS THEY EXPAND THEIR OWN CONCEPT OF REALITY. SUCH AFFECTIVE LEARNING, FAR MORE DIFFICULT TO PERCEIVE AND EVALUATE THAN COGNITIVE LEARNING, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A MAJOR ORGANIZING ELEMENT OF THE CURRICULUM ALONG WITH CONCEPTS AND SKILLS. SINCE AFFECTIVE LEARNING STRESSES VALUES, APPRECIATIONS, AND ATTITUDES, EDUCATORS MUST IDENTIFY, CLARIFY, AND EVEN JUSTIFY THE VALUES, CONSIDER WAYS OF MEASURING ACHIEVEMENT IN AFFECTIVE LEARNING, AND PROVIDE SITUATIONS WHICH ENCOURAGE STUDENT INVOLVEMENT. DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF STUDENT ATTITUDES SHOULD BECOME BASIC TO EFFECTIVE FACULTY WORK WITH STUDENTS, WHILE PRESSURES OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA AND OF TIME MUST YIELD TO WHAT MAY BE UNORTHODOX TEACHING AND LEARNING TECHNIQUES. THIS PAPER, A SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE OREGON STATE FOREIGN LANGUAGE CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 12, 1966, WAS PUBLISHED AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE "FOREIGN LANGUAGE NEWSLETTER OF OREGON," VOLUME 4, NUMBER 2, JANUARY 1967. (GJ)

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DO WE REALLY WANT STUDENTS TO LEARN? *

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On the surface this is a ridiculous question. Of course, we want students to learn. I'm not even sure that I like it. However, I suspect that I don't like it for reasons different from yours. I know what I mean by the question, and an honest answer for myself and my own teaching leaves me feeling very uncomfortable.

In order to deal with the question as posed I will attempt to do six things. First, I will try to distinguish between what I mean by learning and by performing. Second, I will describe what will be termed personal learning. Third, is an attempt to account for current concern with personal learning. Fourth, there is some attention given to the difficulties inherent in a treatment of personal learning. Fifth, there are some assumptions and questions about personal learning, hopefully to stimulate thought. Finally, there are some selected implications for educators, wherever they find themselves.

Performing, in this context, is student behavior which is exhibited to satisfy external standards for the purpose of achieving some goal apart from the quality of the performance itself. Such standards are set and applied by someone other than the performer. The goal is usually imbedded in some context other than the context of the performance. One brief illustration. In my own field, students admittedly take and pass courses in education not to become good teachers, supposedly our goal, but to achieve a teacher's certificate. They see no relation between, say a methods course and what they do on a student teaching situation. They perform and quietly discard in relation to the course.

Learning, on the other hand, is student behavior which is persisted over a long period of time. It is behavior which grows from the context in which it is taught. It is behavior which is sought by the student for itself. It is its own reward. It has deep meanings for the individual, is pursued deliberately by the individual, and is behavior which needs no external reward.

The reason which underlies the title of this paper is that much of what is sought in schools everywhere today is performance on the part of students, not learning. Evidence for such an assertion is of a wide variety. For example, witness increasing emphasis upon external examinations of a competitive nature. Success leads to another chance. A good performance wins the day. Or, in elementary schools the persistent notion that retention will cure a poor performance. And failure is based upon the extent to which a student performs relative to a grade-level standard. I could continue but perhaps you understand the basis for my assertion.

The reason for my raising the question with you is that I am convinced that a second language has a unique contribution to make to student learning, to student

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living. This contribution is major, it is that a second language, if I understand language at all, can help an individual to expand his construct of reality, his understanding of his own personal work. And it is the personal side of learning to which the remainder of my remarks are addressed. It is the personal side of learning which I see as crucial, no, essential to the improvement of educational opportunities. My hope is that students can be viewed increasingly as learners. My plea is that all teachers, each in his own way, through his own specialty, move in concert to create educational programs in which students can learn, not perform.

In order that we may all have a common frame of reference for discussing personal learning, let me give a brief history of the development of a document which has been in large measure responsible for the currency of a term "the affective domain."

In 1948 a group of psychologists with a specific concern for achievement testing at various levels arrived at a classification of "the types of human reaction or response to the content, subject matter, problems, or areas of human experience--which seem most significant for our purposes." (1) These psychologists, in dealing with educational objectives, identified two processes through which they believed that educational objectives might be more useful than had heretofore been the case. One of these processes was to define an objective in behavioral terms so that achievement might be more easily measured. The second process was to describe the whole range of human response and to develop a set of categories which would make it possible to place any one behavioral objective in its proper place within the categories.

The first result of the efforts of this committee of psychologists (published in 1956) was called The Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Classification of Educational Goals, Handbook I: The Cognitive Domain, edited by Bloom and others. Within the cognitive domain the committee identified and described six levels of human mental behavior. These are knowledge of specifics or recall, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation.

In 1964 the second taxonomy of educational objectives appeared. This was Handbook II: Affective Domain. The editors of the second handbook describe the affective domain as follows:

> Objectives which emphasize a feeling tone, an emotion, or a degree of acceptance or rejection. Affective objectives vary from simple attention to selected phenomena to complex but internally consistent qualities of character and conscience. We found a large number of such objectives in the literature expressed as interests, attitudes, appreciations, values, and emotional sets or biases. (2)

Darling has summarized the types and levels of behaviors in the affective domain in this way:

> The reader may recall that there are five levels in the hierarchy of the affective taxonomy: (1) Receiving, (2) Responding, (3) Valuing, (4) Organizing, and (5) Characterization. All the behaviors of level I (Receiving), i.e., awareness, willingness to receive, and selective attention, are indicators of a progression of interest. Likewise the

> first step of Level II (Responding), acquiescence in responding, is the highest level of interest before attitudes are affected. Both interest and attitude are at play when a child exhibits a willingness to respond and then derives some satisfaction from his response (the two remaining steps in Responding.)
>
> Interests, attitudes, and values are all apparent when a child indicates the acceptance of a value and then, through his behavior, indicates a preference for a value. These behaviors are the first two steps of Level III (Valuing). When a child indicates a commitment to a value, he has moved beyond mere interests, but attitudes and values are still of concern. Also in the attitude-value overlap is the conceptualization of a value, a step beyond commitment, and the first step of Level IV (Organizing). Finally, the child (or adult) moves beyond mere attitudes to the highest levels of value formation when he reaches the highest step of Level IV, organization of a value system, and then moves through Characterization by formulating a generalized value set and then he is able to relate this set to the larger world in which he lives; there the set becomes the Characterization of the individual. The latter two behaviors compose Level V (Characterization). (3)

The foregoing serves to describe both the different types of behavior represented in the affective domain and the progression of these behaviors from "lack of awareness" to a real commitment on the part of the student. The purpose of this presentation is not to assert, and indeed the editors of the taxonomy do not so assert, that the taxonomy is accurate or complete. Here, the purpose is to alert educators to the possibilities and problems related to the affective domain as we plan and implement educational programs.

As has been indicated, in current curriculum literature, the personal side of learning is technically termed the affective domain. Within this domain, most writers include consideration of values, attitudes, interests, and appreciations. In this framework, affective learning, is the acquisition of values, attitudes, interests, and appreciations. This kind of learning is contrasted to the acquisition of specific information, analyzing, synthesizing, throwing a ball, swimming, and the like. Thus, the focus of this paper is on some questions related to affective learning or the learning of values, appreciations, and attitudes.

Let us consider the reason for the present concern regarding the personal side of learning. Historically, values as a general category, presently understood to include appreciations and attitudes, have been considered by some curriculum theorists as one of the three organizing elements of the curriculum. The other two are concepts and skills. Perhaps one of the most cogent statements regarding the function of the three organizing elements in the curriculum is found in a book called Toward Improved Curriculum Theory, in a paper by Ralph Tyler entitled "The Organization of Learning Experiences." He identified concepts and skills as the first two major organizing elements, and then Tyler goes on to say:

> A third type of element which sometimes appears in curriculum guides and courses of study is that of values. When values serve as the organizing element, the educational program is planned to develop loyalty to certain ideals or interests in certain objects and activities.

> One value which is commonly stressed in social studies courses is the respect for the dignity and worth of every individual regardless of his race, religion, occupation, nationality, or social class. (4)

Thus, one of the reasons for continuing interest in the question of affective learning is that values typically form one of the major organizing elements in an educational program.

Furthermore, there have been studies in recent years which deal with values. Some years ago, Jacobs (5), Getzels (6), Battle (7), among others conducted studies regarding student and teacher values in their relation tc one another. Some studies reveal that though we attempt and claim to do something about teaching values in our educational programs, little change occurs in student values, either at the high school or at the college level. That the concern is real is further attested to by the appearance in 1964 of the second Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Affective Domain. In part, editors describe the need for a classification of educational objectives in the affective domain in these words: "Rather it is in its usefulness to teachers, evaluators, and curriculum workers. It is also in the extent to which it can help educators redress the erosion in the meaning and substance of affective objectives which has resulted from the greater emphasis on cognitive objectives." (8) One thesis of the editors of the affective domain, then, is that we have in fact turned our backs on affective objectives and they list a number of reasons why this is true. This will be dealt with later on. Darling raises the question of whether or not the school in fact is responsible for inculcation of values, interests, and attitudes, and asserts that such a tool as the affective domain handbook can serve to clarify and classify those objectives for which the school feels it does have some responsibility. (9) Some are now beginning to use the handbook as a research tool to develop measures of affective learning. DeVault and Neufeld of Wisconsin are two who are attempting to design instruments for measuring student growth in the affective domain. I myself am attempting to devise an instrument to describe teacher attitudes toward such concepts as poverty and racially mixed groups.

Granting the assertion that there is today an intensive and active interest in the question of personal learning, what accounts for it? As is the case with most questions of human motivation, there is no simple explanation, no one factor which accounts for the total picture. Perhaps the best that can be done is to look at some contemporary events and attempt to infer from them some reasons for educational concern for personal learning.

Item: Parade Magazine on Sunday, February 13, 1966, an article describes the growing involvement of women college students in current social crises. One thing the article made quite clear was that college students in general are rebelling against a depersonalized education. They appear to resent large classes in which they are unknown as individuals. Saturday Review for February 1966 carries a similar article in its education supplement, entitled "Call Me By My Rightful Number."

Item: Young adults are immersing themselves in social action groups in an attempt to give personal meaning to their lives. Witness voter registrations, peace demonstrations, Peace Corps enrollment, and participation in VISTA.

Item: School dropout statistics suggest that formal schooling does not allow students to derive personal meaning from their education.

Item: The prospects of a federal and/or a national assessment program have caused educators to pause and consider first, the effect of such a program on individuals, and second the extent to which the "real stuff" of education can be measured.

Item: Senior and even junior high school students are being programed by computers adding, at least on the surface, to the depersonalized picture of education.

Item: Proposed computer-based instruction has led some educators to caution against total depersonalization of educational programs.

Thus a host of factors may be hypothesized as a recognized or unrecognized basis for the search for a way to improve education in general at the same time we assure that such education have personal meaning for each individual. If these developments among students should serve no other purpose than to alert us to the necessity for continued and intelligent attention to personal learning they will have made a significant contribution during this period of educational innovation.

It appears clear, on the basis of the evidence available, that to ignore personal learning is to diminish both the quality and quantity of education which students receive. It also appears clear that educators are alerted to the necessity for attention to personal learning.

As with all education, there is a myriad of problems inherent in working with a personal learning. The very nature of the question itself, that is, the question of what occurs within the personal learning and the school's responsibility for it raises a whole host of additional questions. Since the personal learning or learning described in the affective domain is concerned exclusively with such questions as values, attitudes, and interests, we, at the outset, must face up to whether or not the school can and should attempt to alter the values, appreciations, and attitudes which students hold when they come to school. If so, we can justify the selection of a particular set of values, attitudes, and interests? If not, then why raise the question at all? Thus, when we begin to discuss the problem of values we must face the philosophical questions involved in it. In other words, when we talk about the affective domain we must face up to the moral issues: (1) Should schools attempt to alter values of students? (2) If so, then, which values should we have them acquire? (3) How do we justify the values we select? (4) In which ways should these values be taught? These are some of the philosophical questions to be considered. Others will be raised later.

If we move to a discussion of the psychological difficulties of the affective domain, we must regard such questions as how do we measure progress in the affective domain? Krahwohl and his associates who edited the affective domain handbook raised the question very clearly. Some of the problems which they describe in relation to affective objectives, now, within the affective domain are these: "The failure to grade students' achievement on affective objectives accounts for a large portion of the erosion" that is, the erosion of attention to objectives in the affective domain. (10)

> Cognitive achievement is regarded as fair game for grading purposes. Examinations may include a great range of types of cognitive objectives, and teachers and examiners have little hesitation in giving a student a grade of A or F on the basis of his performance on these cognitive achievement examinations. In contrast, teachers and examiners do not regard it as appropriate to grade students with respect to their interests, attitude, or character development. (11)

Another problem inherent in working in the affective domain has to do with the slow attainment of affective objectives. For example, and I quote again from the affective handbook:

> A particular item of information or a very specific skill is quickly learned and shows immediate results on cognitive examinations.... In contrast, interests, attitudes, and personality characteristics are assumed to develop relatively slowly and to be visible in appraisal techniques only over long periods of time, perhaps even years. Whether these assumptions are sound can only be revealed by much more evidence than is now available. (12)

A third major problem identified by the editors of the affective handbook is that of teaching for affective learning in relation to cognitive learning, and again I quote:

> For a long time it was assumed that if a student learned the information objectives of a course he would, as a direct consequence of this information learning, develop the problem solving objectives in that course. Thus, the teacher's responsibility was reduced to that of providing learning experiences to develop the information in students, and the examination was designed to appraise the students' progress toward the information objectives. As a result of the research and writings of Tyler (1934, 1951), Furst (1958), Dressel (1958), and others this belief in the "automatic" development of the higher mental processes is no longer widely held. However, there still persists an implicit belief that if cognitive objectives are developed, there will be a corresponding development of appropriate affective behaviors. Research summarized by Jacob (1957) raises serious questions about the tenability of this assumption. The evidence suggests that affective behaviors develop when appropriate learning experiences are provided for students much the same as cognitive behaviors develop from appropriate learning experiences.
>
> The authors of this work (that is, the cognitive handbook) hold the view that under some conditions development of cognitive behaviors and that, instead of a positive relation between growth in cognitive and affective behavior, it is conceivable that there may be an inverse relation between the growth in the two domains. For example, it is quite possible that many literature courses at the high-school and college levels instill knowledge of the details of particular works of literature while at the same time producing an aversion to, or at least a lower level of interest in, literary works. (13)

Another problem is that we do not have a language which allows us to communicate effectively about affective learning. The foregoing problems have fallen within the mode of discussion originally designated as psychological: that is, discussion of conditions under which certain behaviors or learnings can occur and the conditions which seem to deter the kind of learning we are talking about. Alluded to also is the mode of practicality; that is, what kinds of practices do teachers engage in assuming that these activities will bear fruits in terms of personal learning? Not discussed at length so far has been the whole philosophical question of identification and clarification of those particular values, appreciations, interests, and attitudes which we would have students demonstrate. I have already indicated that this is a problem of major proportion. Whole schools of philosophical thought have dwelt upon the question of what values should be inculcated and how one can go about justifying values. It is beyond the scope of this presentation to dwell at length upon the question of the justification of values. Nonetheless, it is important that as we begin to talk about the affective domain we devise for ourselves some method by which we can satisfy ourselves individually or collectively within a school system that we are quite certain about the values we intend to pass on to the young and some measure of justification for the values we select over other values. (Presently it appears that the values we implicitly or explicitly hold differ significantly from those of students, and that the discrepancy is growing.) If this is not so, certainly the actions of the young would serve to indicate that they are more apt to act upon the values which they hold and perhaps are even more apt to clarify their own values for themselves than as been true in past decades. Thus the whole idea, the whole problem of identifying, clarifying, justifying those values which we would have the students of any age acquire has become a problem which demands immediate and serious attention. So as regards affective learning it is not enough simply to describe types of behaviors which will be present if certain values occur or to talk about the conditions under which certain value changes occur or to talk about the practicality of the classroom situation. We must select, clarify, and justify those values which we would pass on. This has been repeated a number of times within the last few moments and it is done deliberately because we have failed to come to grips with the question of what values and for whom. In part the failure results from the lack of the taxonomical kinds of considerations discussed earlier, the psychological considerations, and the practical considerations. One of the first steps in working with the affective domain is in fact the settling upon those values which we think are important. Then we are in a position to employ the language of the taxonomy, the language of psychology, and the language of the classroom in order to bring about those value changes which we deem significant, important, and desirable.

I would like now to turn attention to the third major division within this paper which I have described as some assumptions for consideration. This particular section is of rather a speculative nature. I fail to find research results which would either support or refute some of the things which I am about to propose. The things which are about to be suggested are offered in the sense of testable hypotheses and not as any conclusive statements of fact. What occurs in this section really is a series of assertions which, as I have said, are testable in nature, but which offer at least the beginnings of a rationale for working in classrooms in the affective domain. In the final section an attempt is made

to relate these assumptions to implications for educational practices. The latter section, of course, is wholly dependent on the tenability of the present section. These assertions are as follows:

1. Learning is evidenced by a change in behavior.

2. That for the most part individuals behave in accordance with their values. That is, individuals do not tend to behave in ways which they do not value.

3. That learning which has depth of meaning to an individual occurs when that individual alters his own value pattern to some degree.

The summation of these three assertions is that unless and until an individual alters the things which he values, alters his interests, alters his attitudes, no real learning has occurred.

4. The fourth assertion, and perhaps this is the most important, is that the foregoing three assertions apply as equally to cognitive and psychomotor learning as to affective learning; or without affective learning no cognitive or psychomotor learning can occur. Or again restated, that an individual's interest in, attendance to, willingness to receive information about, govern the extent to which an individual will in fact incorporate information, analyze it, apply it, synthesize and evaluate it. For purposes of exploration I am willing to assert that unless and until an individual is totally immersed in a situation, no real learning of facts, no real ability to analyze, to synthesize, will occur. Thus, what we have accepted as evidence of cognitive or psychomotor learning is a mere ghost of what can occur. What we have accepted as evidence that a student has learned <u>anything</u> has not sufficiently accounted for affective learning. And this is true because we have failed to provide situations which will allow the individual to alter his values, to come to grips with what he values and to see the consequences of holding particular values.

5. Fifth, I assume that learning contains some elements of frustration, ambiguity or uncertainty.

In Snygg's words:

> Generally speaking, a learner will accept into his field anything which fits what he already believes but there are two qualifications: a) in order to be perceived or assimilated an object or event must be necessary to the field of organization; b) assimilation of an event involves what another person, looking at the event from the point of view of his own perceptual field, would call distortion. Any item's value and meaning are aspects of its function in the perceiver's particular field at that particular time.
>
> If these conclusions are correct, any attempt to make a really significant change in a student's field by verbal means seems foredoomed to failure. Lectures, reading assignments, and class discussions may give students the raw material for filling gaps in their perceptual worlds and for rationalizing the preconceptions they already have.

> Such methods by themselves, however, are not at all likely to cause radical change in the student's concept of reality.
>
> The usual plan for overriding this impacable mechanism for protecting the student against the intrusion of dissonant perceptions is to disorganize his field by threats of failure and humiliation in hope that he will try to remove the threat by learning the required material. The results are frequently far from what teachers and parents intend. All teachers are by now aware of the cheating and the defensive changes in self-concept and personal values that may result among "poor" students. More attention should be given to the problem of the good student who learns the required material for examination purposes but keeps it from entering and changing his view of reality by dividing his field into two parts, "reality" and "school," the latter having nothing to do with real life. (14)

Finally, we take a brief look at the implications of the foregoing for educational practices. If indeed students are failing to derive positive affective meaning from educational programs, and if affective meaning is essential to real learning, then we must take steps to offer learners the opportunity to participate wholeheartedly in their own education. While the examples of protestation given earlier centered upon older students, we can not escape evidence which suggests that younger students as well fail to derive personal meaning from their schooling. Though such evidence is neither extensive or conclusive, it is indicative. For example, some local studies suggest that beginning in grade three, children shift from learning based upon their own curiosity to learning to please the teacher. One might, in fact, interpret Getzel's and Jackson's study on intelligence and creativity to mean that successful students in the eyes of teachers and parents, are those who conform to the desires of adults. Informally, but to my mind no less convincing, is the evidence offered by graduate students who plea, "Please tell me what you want and I'll do it." Or that offered by too many neophyte teachers who play guessing games with students--"Guess what answer I am seeking."

Impersonal education runs the gamut from nursery school to doctoral programs. We have not demonstrated our ability to design programs and to display instructional behavior which will or even can result in desirable affective learning. We have given lip service to educational objectives which are different from memorizing facts, but we have in practice denied the existence, nay, even the desirability of objectives of affective learning. We have rewarded those learnings which conform, which are simply measured and which have academic respectability.

None of the preceding is to be interpreted as condoning irresponsibility or license on the part of students. It is rather to suggest that what we in education have for years supported at the verbal level must become operative in the classroom. It is also to suggest that what we have equated with learning is not what students accept as learning. Actually, much of the concern here and in general does nothing more than parallel what has been said by Dewey, Kilpatrick and others. Since early in this century, pleas to make learning "real" and "personal" have been made. In some measure, we have responded with honest attempts to make academic learning palatable to students. But, if the

evidence cited above is relevant, even here we have not been successful. To an even smaller degree have we touched the affective side of learning. This appears to be true in the following ways: we have not affected student values to any significant degree; we have not discovered strategies which involve students personally in cognitive learning, which is tosay that we have not truly altered student values regarding what we have chosen to call worthwhile learning. Learn students do. Acquire values students do. But what do they learn and which values do they acquire? I would assert that we have either caused or permitted students to value extrinsic rewards to such an extent that they find it difficult if not impossible to become affectively involved with cognitive learning, or with learning for its own sake.

In our desire to be humane, we have perhaps created conditions which prevent the deep, personal involvement of students that Snygg and others declare is essential to learning. We have stressed the need for student success, and indeed success is important. But what kind of satisfaction does one achieve through succeeding at a series of non-real impersonal tasks?

Snygg states that:

> ...Contrary to the general opinion among teachers, which postulates that all failure is detrimental because it causes frustrations and thus either aggression or withdrawal, and contrary to the opinion of reinforcement theorists, which tends to assume that material should be so easy that all responses to it will be "correct" (so that they may be reinforced), perceptual field theory suggests that the optimum level of difficulty is one which allows the student to win success after difficulty.
>
> If our basic goal is indeed a greater feeling of personal worth and value, tasks which require little talent or effort are bound to be unrewarding and boring and to be as unproductive and harmful from an educational point of view as are problems that are completely beyond the current capacity of the student. Most teachers and educators are aware of the latter danger; fewer seem to have considered the first. (15)

Assuming the validity of Snygg's assertions, what then? Much has already been suggested regarding different approaches to affective learning on the part of the students. In summary then: 1) We must determine whether indeed we should devote our efforts to involving students in affective learning. If we are, in fact, committed to such efforts, we must have the intellectual courage to change the substance of present day curriculum and instruction rather than to continue to make superficial alterations in the educational superstructure.

2) We, meaning those with responsibility for planning and implementing educational programs, must clarify and justify for ourselves those values which in our own situations we consider to be paramount. This might well include the value that students should understand and develop their own values.

3) We must develop a language which allows us to communicate about effective learning. The second Taxonomy of Educational Objectives is a worthy step in this direction.

4) Again, if we determine that students should be involved in affective learning, we must assist those working directly with pupils to provide situations which offer promise of actual student involvement.

5) We must be willing to accept the consequences of true affective learning on the part of students, if indeed we determine that affective learning is an essential part of formal education. For example, we must be willing to accept the hostility and frustration which often accompanies honest involvement.

6) The focus of instruction must be enlarged to include time for teachers to learn about students--to learn how they now view their world, how they feel in relation to their world. We must come to know what is real for students and what they see as the relation between school and life. Each of us who teaches must see this as a legitimate and necessary facet of instruction, if students are to learn. And this kind of time spent with students must be recognized by non-teaching staff and by parents as essential to student learning.

7) If we really want students to learn, we must know what they value. This we can discover through honest discourse. We must have in mind and share honestly with students our own values, our own sense of direction. We must know clearly what constitutes evidence of real learning for each student.

8) We must free up programs--find ways to overcome time pressures on teachers and thus on students. We must replace performance standards with criteria which are relevant to the three major components in a classroom--students, teachers and subject matter.

Unless I have communicated the urgency of the situation, unless I have made clear what I see as the difference between performing and learning, the foregoing is bound to sound sentimental and soft. Not so.

Intellectually and emotionally, or cognitively and affectively, there is nothing more demanding of teachers and student than real learning. It requires analytical skills, it requires patience, it requires tolerance for ambiguity, it requires living with insecurity, it requires excitement about living and learning, it requires deep knowledge of human kind and of subject matter. It requires being able to wait for results, it requires being able to see the first glimmer of an interest and the ability to help the student nourish and extend the interest. It requires finger-tip knowledge of resources. It requires the ability to look ahead and plan instructional strategies for individuals. There is no need for a teacher whose students are truly learning to apologize to <u>anyone</u> for what might be unorthodox approaches to teaching and learning. There is no more intellectually complex task than good teaching.

Because of what I view as real learning, and of what I view as a major function of the study of a second language, you have enviable opportunities to demonstrate ways in which real learning among students can occur at all levels.

Student behavior at many levels indicates that there is discrepancy, yet undescribed, between student values and operative educational values. Research suggests that we have had little impact on the values of students. Many then assume that because we have not we can not. Circumstances, including our historic commitment to the teaching of values place us in the uncomfortable but exciting position of dealing honestly and intelligently with this question. In the vernacular, the time has come for us to "fish or cut bait."

(1) David R. Krathwohl, Benjamin S. Bloom, Bertram B. Masia, The Taxonomy of Educational Objectives; The Classification of Educational Goals. Handbook II: Affective Domain (New York: David McKay, Inc., 1964) p. 3.

(2) Ibid., p. 7.

(3) David W. Darling, "Why a Taxonomy of Affective Learning," Educational Leadership, Volume 22, No. 1, p. 473.

(4) Ralph W. Tyler, "The Organization of Learning Experiences," Toward Improved Curriculum Theory, edited by V. E. Herrick, Ralph W. Tyler (Supplementary Educational Monograph, University of Chicago Press, 1950) p. 64.

(5) Phillip E. Jacob, Changing Values in College (New York, Harper, 1957)

(6) J. W. Getzels, "Changing Values," School Review, Spring, 1957.

(7) H. J. Battle, "Application of Inverted Analysis in a Study of the Relation Between Values and Achievement" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1954)

(8) Krathwohl, op. cit., p. 14.

(9) Darling, op. cit., p. 522.

(10) Krathwohl, op. cit., p. 10.

(11) Ibid., pp. 10-11.

(12) Ibid., pp. 18-19.

(13) Ibid., pp. 19-20.

(14) Donald Snygg, "A Cognitive Field Theory of Learning," Learning and Mental Health in the School (Washington: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, NEA, 1966)

(15) Ibid., pp. 93-94.